The short answer
The Defence Strategic Review advised government on a changed strategic environment and the force Australia should develop. Its public release in April 2023 was neither a new Act nor proof that proposed capabilities already existed. The review, government response and subsequent implementation need to be read as connected but different stages.
Chronology
A timeline of the turning points
Independent review begins
Stephen Smith and Angus Houston receive a broad planning brief.
Advice delivered
The version provided to government contains sensitive material not all made public.
Public release and policy response
Government publishes the public review and sets its own priorities.
New organisations
Defence later records establishment of the Submarine Agency and capabilities accelerator.
Reprioritisation and implementation
Organisational changes, contracts and further planning follow; they are not all completed capabilities.
The public document was not the complete classified advice
Smith and Houston’s foreword dates the commission to August 2022 and their report to February 2023. It explicitly distinguishes the less detailed public version from the sensitive advice supplied to government.
The government released the public review with its response on 24 April. Publication allowed scrutiny of the broad strategic argument, but did not reveal every operational judgment. Nor did the reviewers’ recommendations automatically become binding law. Advisers assessed options; elected government decided its response and remained responsible for resourcing and execution.
The strategic argument connected defence with the wider state
The review described sharper major-power competition and reduced warning time. Its proposed National Defence approach reached beyond the armed forces to diplomacy, industry and broader national capacity.
That did not mean every policy became a military function. The government response gave diplomacy and regional partnerships their own place. The central claim was that security could not be achieved by treating force structure, economic connections and statecraft as isolated subjects. Whether particular capabilities matched that argument remained a separate question open to public criticism.
Priorities required trade-offs, not the addition of every project
The response prioritised submarines, longer-range strike, northern bases, personnel, technology and regional partnerships. Contemporary reporting explained how the emphasis on maritime and northern approaches reshaped the role of Army and reduced some planned projects.
A decision to move funds or workforce towards one capability creates an opportunity cost elsewhere. Calling that reprioritisation does not establish that the discarded project was worthless, or that its replacement was already available. The important policy question is whether the resulting combination of capabilities meets the stated purpose within realistic time, workforce and industrial constraints.
Agreement did not settle the strategic debate
The government agreed, or agreed in principle with further work, to the public recommendations. The distinction allowed an overall policy direction while leaving detailed decisions and dependencies to be resolved.
Michael Clarke’s October 2023 UTS analysis questioned the alignment between the deterrence concept and present and future capabilities. It is a scholar’s assessment, not an audit finding that every recommendation failed. The criticism provides a useful test: a strategy should explain the threat or behaviour to be deterred, the tools available and the way those tools are expected to work, rather than relying on the reassuring effect of the word deterrence.
Later reports show steps taken, not automatic delivery of the whole plan
Defence’s 2023–24 annual report records the Submarine Agency and Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator beginning in July 2023, a rebuilt investment programme, Army changes and signed contracts. These are identifiable administrative and procurement milestones.
An agency’s establishment is not a submarine’s arrival; a contract is not the same as a fully trained operational unit. Annual reporting supplies evidence about progress while also reflecting the department’s own account. A careful reading therefore distinguishes adopted direction, allocated resources, contractual commitments and delivered capability. That is more informative than declaring the review either completely implemented on release day or entirely ineffective because long-term work remained.
Sources for this section: [5]
Biography context
Explore Australia through connected lives
Richard Marles
Read his legal, union and parliamentary background and ministerial scrutiny.
Explore the biographiesDiplomacyPenny Wong
Place defence planning beside regional diplomacy rather than treating them as identical.
Explore the biographiesCompare review and legislationJim Chalmers
Compare the different institutional path from the RBA review to a new statutory framework.
Explore the biographiesConnected biographies
The minister responsible for the government’s response
1967–
Richard Marles
Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister and member for CorioRichard Marles moved from law and union leadership into representing Corio, then became Labor’s deputy leader and a senior minister. Defence strategy, regional relationships and the practical demands of procurement now sit beside his continuing parliamentary and local responsibilities.Read biographyQuick answers
Common questions
- Was the public review the full classified report?
- No. Its foreword explicitly describes a less detailed public version.
- Did recommendations automatically become legislation?
- No. The review advised government, which issued a separate policy response.
- Did every public recommendation receive unconditional approval?
- The response included agreement in principle with further work, as well as agreement.
- Does a signed procurement contract prove operational delivery?
- No. Contracting, delivery, training and operational availability are different milestones.
Primary and institutional sources
How this history was checked
The public review’s foreword, selected summary and response passages were read through a government-hosted mirror after the publisher’s page exposed an unextractable flipbook. No classified report or complete 116-page public volume was consumed. Selected annual-report progress passages are not a full procurement audit. Marles’s February 2023 Pentagon frame identifies him before the April release; it does not depict the review’s launch. This article was reviewed on 24 October 2026.
- Australian Government / WA Government mirrorNational Defence 2023: selected foreword, summary and government-response passages
- Defence Ministers24 April 2023: public review release and six initial priorities
- ABC News24 April 2023: changed posture, trade-offs and capability priorities
- Michael Clarke / UTS Australia-China Relations Institute30 October 2023: selected critique of deterrence strategy and capability alignment
- Department of DefenceAnnual report 2023–24: selected progress-since-review passage, printed pages iv–v
- Alexander Kubitza / U.S. Secretary of Defense230203-D-PM193-2057: complete Pentagon bilateral-exchange frame